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PUNISHING TRUTHFUL, NEWSWORTHY
DISCLOSURES: THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
APPLICATION OF THE
FEDERAL WIRETAP STATUTE
Rex S. Heinke and Seth MM Stodder*
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 21, 1996, several Republican leaders of the House of
Representatives, including former House Speaker Newt Gingrich and
Representative Richard Armey, participated in a conference call to discuss
potential responses to the House Ethics Committee's probe of Speaker
Gingrich.' Republican Conference Committee Chairman, Ohio
Representative John Boehner, also participated in the conference call from
a Florida restaurant parking lot, via a cellular telephone.2 Unbeknownst to
the participants in the conference call, a Florida couple, Alice and John
Martin, apparently had followed Representative Boehner to the parking lot
and intercepted Boehner's cellular transmission using a police scanner.
After listening to the conference call, the Martins determined that the
conversation was politically damaging to the House Republicans and
delivered a tape recording of the conversation to Democratic
Representative Kay Thurman of Florida.4
In January 1997, Representative Thurman apparently' discussed the
contents of the tape with House Minority Whip David Bonior.6 Bonior
Rex S. Heinke is a partner in the Los Angeles office of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP.
Seth M.M. Stodder is an associate in the Washington, D.C. office of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
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Our thanks go to Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher LLP, for his invaluable help with the Article. In February 1999, Mr. Boutrous
and Mr. Stodder filed an arnicus brief on behalf of various news organizations in the Boehner v.
McDermott case, discussed in this Article, and currently pending in the D.C. Circuit.
1. Boehner v. McDermott, No. CIV. 98-594 TFH, 1998 WL 436897, at *1 (D.D.C. July 28,
1998).
2. Id.
3. Id
4. Id.
5. See id at * 1 n. 1. As noted by the district judge in Boehner the actual facts of the case-
and especially the acts of some of the participants-are unknown and unproven. Accordingly, the
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then allegedly advised Thurman to tell the Martins to give the tape to
Democratic Representative James A. McDermott, a member of the House
Ethics Committee, the body investigating Speaker Gingrich's conduct.7
On January 8, 1997, the Martins delivered a copy of the tape to
McDermott's office with a letter allegedly explaining the origins of the
tape.8 In the letter, the Martins apparently stated that Representative
Thurman had told them that McDermott would arrange for them to receive
immunity from any criminal prosecution related to the interception of the
conference call. 9 After accepting the tape and the letter, McDermott
distributed copies to at least three publications, The New York Times, The
Atlanta Journal-Constitution and Roll Call.'° On January 10, 1997, The
New York Times broke the story concerning the conference call without
mentioning Representative Boehner's name. 1
The Martins' conduct may have been illegal under the federal law
governing intercepted conversations (commonly called "wiretaps"). 2 In
relevant part, 18 U.S.C. section 2511(1) imposes liability on any person
who:
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures
any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire,
oral, or electronic communication;
(b) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, or procures any other
person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or
other device to intercept any oral communications [under a
variety of conditions];
(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other
person. the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, knowing or having reason to know that the
information was obtained through the interception of a wire,
oral, or electronic communication in violation of [the wiretap
statute];
(d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any
discussion in Boehner and in this Article rests on the allegations as stated in the plaintiff John A.
Boehner's Complaint and assumes arguendo that the allegations are true. This distinction is
irrelevant to the legal issues addressed in this Article.
6. Id.
7. Boehner, 1998 WL 436897, at *1.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.; see Adam Clymer, Gingrich Is Heard Urging Tactics In Ethics Case, N.Y. TIMEs,
Jan 10, 1999, at Al, A20.
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(West Supp. 1998).
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wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having
reason to know that the information was obtained through the
interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in
violation of [the wiretap statute].
Applying the elements of the federal wiretapping statute, the Martins
apparently intercepted the communication using a device, disclosed the
contents of the communication, and arguably "used" the contents of the
communication. 14 As a result, the Martins faced criminal charges 15 and
could have been subject to a civil suit for injunctive relief, damages, and
attorneys' fees.1 6 Upon failing to obtain immunity, the Martins pled guilty
on April 23, 1997, and were fined $500.17
However, the other participants, McDermott and the publications,
were not subjected to any criminal liability. Presumably, McDermott knew
the origins of the tape recording; indeed, the Martins' letter to him
allegedly stated this fact explicitly."8 Therefore, when McDermott turned
over copies of the tape to the publications, he may have intentionally
disclosed the contents of a wire, oral, or electronic communication,
knowing that the information was obtained through interception of a wire,
oral, or electronic communication in violation of the wiretap statute.19
Hence, McDermott's conduct arguably violated the law. Furthermore, the
publications arguably violated the law to the extent that they knew the
origin of the tape when they published its contents.
Thus, on March 9, 1998, Representative Boehner sued McDermott for
violating the wiretap statute, as well as the analogous Florida statute.20 On
July 28, 1998, however, United States District Judge Thomas F. Hogan
dismissed Boehner's lawsuit, finding that McDermott could not be held
liable for disclosing information that he had lawfully acquired from the
Martins, even though the Martins had unlawfully acquired the
information.2' Judge Hogan relied primarily on the principles announced
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
13. Id. § 251 (1 Xa)-(d).
14. Boehner, 1998 WL 436897, at *3.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4).
16. Id.
17. Boehner, 1998 WL 436897, at *2. According to the Boehner decision, the Martins were
prosecuted only for their actual interception of the call based on 18 U.S.C. section 251 (I1Xa);
they were not prosecuted for the use of the scanner or the disclosure or use of the intercepted
communication.
18. Id. at*l.
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(lXc).
20. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 52 0(a), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.10 (West 1998).
21. See Boehner, 1998 WL 436897, at *1.
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Cohn22 and its progeny. Representative Boehner has appealed the judge's
decision and the case is currently pending in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
This Article addresses the precise question raised in Boehner: can or
should an individual or company be held liable for disclosing truthful
information of public significance, knowing the information was originally
obtained unlawfully? Basic and well-established First Amendment and
common law principles mandate that the answer is no.23 The First
Amendment will not tolerate the punishment of individuals or
organizations for disclosing truthful, newsworthy information that they
have lawfully obtained.
II. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The federal wiretap statute was originally enacted by Congress in
1968, as Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
(hereinafter "Act"). 24 Section 2511(1) has essentially remained the same
ever since, except that in 1986 and in 1994, it was expressly broadened to
include all "wire, oral, and electronic communications."
'
In its current form, section 2511(1) bars not only the interception of
wire, oral, and electronic communications, but also prohibits the knowing
disclosure of illegally intercepted communications and their intentional use,
knowing they were illegally obtained.2 6 Accordingly, the federal wiretap
statute appears to cover the Boehner situation, prohibiting the disclosure of
electronic communications, even by those who have lawfully obtained the
information.
Congress expressly recognized the potential constitutional problems
with the legislation. The Senate Report concerning the bill notes that "[t]he
disclosure of the contents of an intercepted communication that had already
become 'public information' or 'common knowledge' would not be
prohibited., 2 7  Yet the plain language of the statute contains no such
22. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
23. This Article only addresses the question raised in Boehner. It does not address the
additional lurking question of whether the First Amendment prohibits punishment for the
disclosure of information that the discloser has illegally obtained.
24. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).
25. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
§ 101(cXlXA), 100 Stat. 1851 (1986) (substituting "wire, oral, or electronic communication" for
"wire and oral communication") (emphasis added); Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994)
(adding among other things specific references to wireless and electronic communications).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1Xc)-(d).
27. S. Rup. No. 90-1097, at 2181 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2181.
[Vol. 19
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limitation. Since 1968, despite the various amendments to the wiretap
statute, the legislative history has been silent as to the law's potential
impact on free speech and free press.
III. THE BOEHNER DECISION
A. Boehner v. McDermott
In Boehner, Judge Hogan ruled that the provisions of the federal
wiretap statute, and an analogous Florida statute which barred the
disclosure of the contents of illegally intercepted communications, could
not be applied constitutionally to McDermott's conduct.28 Accordingly, the
court dismissed Representative Boehner's lawsuit against McDermott 9
The Boehner court proceeded in three basic steps. First, Judge Hogan
concluded that Representative McDermott had lawfully obtained the tape
from the Martins.30  Although the Act prohibits the Martins' interception
and disclosure of the tape to Thurman and McDermott, the Act does not
prohibit McDermott's receipt of the tape.3' The court found that
McDermott did not break any laws in taking possession of the tape because
he lawfully obtained that information.32 Indeed, neither the federal wiretap
statute nor the analogous Florida statute expressly bars the receipt of
information that was originally obtained unlawfully. Thus, under the plain
language of both statutes, McDermott obtained the information lawfully,
although the information was originally obtained unlawfully.Y
28. Throughout the opinion, the Boehner court erroneously refers to 18 U.S.C.
section 251 1(c), instead of section 251 1(1Xc). Representative Boehner sued Representative
McDermott under section 251 1(lXc), not section 2511(c). Section 2511(c) expressly permits
officers under color of law to record conversations to which they are parties, a situation not
presented in Boehner. This error is clearly inadvertent and is immaterial to the Boehner court's
analysis. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03(lXc) (West 1996).
29. Boehner v. McDermott, No. Civ. 98-594 TFH, 1998 WL 436897, at *7 (D.D.C. July 28,
1998).
30. Id. at *4.
31. Id.
32. Id
33. Republican Representative Henry J. Hyde, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee,
disagrees with Judge Hogan's interpretation of 18 U.S.C. section 2511, "express[ing] concern
over Hogan's determination that wiretap statutes did not outlaw McDermott's receipt of the tape-
recorded conversation." Civil Lawsuit Over Release of Tapes of Congressional Phone Call
Dismissea THE NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW, Fall 1998, at 35. As stated by Representative Hyde,
"[t]his certainly was not the intent of the Congress in enacting the statute, and I do not believe it
should be read to produce that result[.]" Id. This statement is a direct quote from a letter
Representative Hyde wrote to Representative Boehner. Id.
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Second, having determined that McDermott .obtained the tape
lawfully, Judge Hogan concluded that under prevailing Supreme Court
authority, the Act could only be applied to McDermott's conduct if
Boehner met the strict scrutiny standard. In other words, the statute must
further "a state interest of the highest order."34 Judge Hogan found that this
result was mandated by four Supreme Court decisions: Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn,35 Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Oklahoma County,6 Smith v.
Daily Mail,37 and Florida Star v. B.JF38 These cases hold that "the First
Amendment prevents sanction for publishing truthful, lawfully acquired,
information of public significance, absent a state interest of the highest
order., 39 Because McDermott had lawfully acquired the information, and
the information clearly was of public significance, the federal and Florida
wiretap statutes could only punish McDermott's disclosure of the
information if the strict scrutiny test was met.
40
Finally, Judge Hogan determined that Boehner's rights in the privacy
of his cellular telephone conversations were not an interest "of the highest
order" sufficient to overcome McDermott's First Amendment right to
disclose the information.4' Judge Hogan reasoned that if the Supreme
Court could conclude in Florida Star that the identity of a rape victim did
not meet that test, Boehner's privacy interest certainly could not either. 42
Accordingly, Judge Hogan dismissed Boehner's lawsuit against
McDermott.
B. The Foundations of the Boehner Decision-A Jurisprudence of
Cautiously Recognizing the Primacy of First Amendment Principles
As discussed above, Judge Hogan relied upon four Supreme Court
decisions in dismissing Boehner's lawsuit. Each case represents an attempt
by the Supreme Court to fashion some dividing line between the privacy
rights of individuals and the First Amendment rights of the press and
public. In each decision the Court has continually refused to establish a
bright line rule, stating that it is only deciding the particular case before it.
34. Boehner, 1998 WL 436897, at *6 (quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541
(1989)).
35. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
36. 430U.S. 308 (1977).
37. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
38. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
39. Boehner, 1998 WL 436897, at *5 (citing Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 533).
40. id. at *6.
41. Id. at *7.
42. Id.
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1. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn
Any analysis of this area of the law must begin with the Court's 1975
decision in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.43 In Cox, a television news
reporter, in the process of broadcasting a story concerning the guilty plea of
six individuals to rape or attempted rape, also broadcasted the name of the
seventeen year-old rape victim." The reporter obtained the victim's name
by reviewing the indictments of the perpetrators, which were public records
generally available for inspection.4 The victim's father then brought an
action against both the reporter and the television station, asserting that the
disclosure had violated a Georgia law, that prohibited persons from
publishing the identity of a rape victim.46
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court held that although the Georgia
law did not provide a civil cause of action, the father had stated a claim for
invasion of his privacy by the publication of his daughter's name.47 The
court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of free
speech and free press did not impact the analysis because the name of a
rape victim was "not a matter of public concern."" Accordingly, the
Georgia Supreme Court determined that section 26-9901 was constitutional
and a "legitimate limitation on the right of freedom of expression contained
in the First Amendment. ''49
In a majority opinion written by Justice Byron White, the United
States Supreme Court reversed the decision. While recognizing in
principle the interest in protecting the privacy of individuals from invasion
by the press,50 the Court held that the government "may not impose
sanctions on the publication of truthful information contained in official
court records open to public inspection."'', Public records by their very
nature are of interest to those concerned with the administration of
government." Hence, the freedom of the press to publish that information
is of critical importance to "our type of government in which the citizenry
43. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
44. Id. at 472-74.
45. Id at 472-73.
46. Id at 471-72 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (Harrison 1972)).
47. Id. at 474.
48. Id. at 475 (quoting Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 200 S.E.2d 127, 134 (Ga. 1973)).
49. Cox, 200 S.E.2d at 134.
50. Cox, 420 U.S. at 487 (citing Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 196 (1890)).
51. Id. at 495.
52. Id
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is the final judge of the proper conduct of public business."53 Therefore,
the Court placed the burden of preserving the confidentiality of private
information revealed during official proceedings on the State, not the
press.
54
In reaching this result, the Court was careful to the narrow the scope
of its decision. Indeed, in his concurrence, Justice Douglas urged the Court
to set forth a broader rule, "that the First Amendment ... prohibits the use
of state law to impose damages for merely discussing public affairs."55 But
the majority rejected Justice Douglas' invitation stating:
In this sphere of collision between claims of privacy and those
of the free press, the interests on both sides are plainly rooted in
the traditions and significant concerns of our society. Rather
than address the broader question whether truthful publications
may ever be subjected to civil or criminal liability consistently
with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, ... it is appropriate
to focus on the narrower interface between press and privacy
that this case presents, namely, whether the State may impose
sanctions on the accurate publication of the name of a rape
victim obtained from public records-more specifically, from
judicial records which are maintained in connection with a
public prosecution and which themselves are open to public
inspection.
5 6
The Cox Court cautioned against setting forth a rule of broad
applicability. Despite the unbroken string of decisions invalidating
attempts to restrict the press' ability to publish truthful information, this
caution has persisted in all the Court's subsequent decisions in this area.
2. Oklahoma Publ 'g Co. v. Oklahoma County
The Court's next opportunity to address the tension between privacy
interests and the First Amendment came in 1977 with Oklahoma
Publishing Co. v. Oklahoma County.57 In Oklahoma Publishing, a federal
district court enjoined the news media from "publishing, broadcasting, or
disseminating, in any manner, the name or picture" of an eleven year-old
53. Id.
54. Id. at 496.
55. Id. at 500-01 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting from Justice Black's concurring opinion
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 295 (1964) (Black, J., concurring)).
56. Cox, 420 U.S. at 491.
57. 430 U.S. 308.
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juvenile who was charged in the murder of a railroad switchman.,
8 The
juvenile's name had been revealed during a detention hearing in Oklahoma
County Juvenile Court where the accused child appeared.59 Reporters were
allowed to attend the hearing.60 Various newspapers and broadcast stations
disseminated the boy's name and picture in their reports on the
proceedings.6' After these disclosures, the district judge entered the order
in question, relying upon an Oklahoma statute providing that juvenile
records are open to public inspection only if ordered by the Court.62
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court vacated the district
court's order, relying on both Cox and Nebraska Press Ass 'n v. Stuart.63
Because the name and picture of the juvenile were publicly revealed in
connection with the prosecution of a crime, the case was indistinguishable
from Cox.64 The press, therefore, had a First Amendment right to publish
the publicly revealed information. Citing similar language in Nebraska
Press, the Court further commented that, under certain circumstances, the
trial court could have closed the juvenile proceedings to the public.
65
However, if the public were allowed to attend the trial, the judge could not
suppress the publication of information from the hearing. 66 As stated by
the Court in Nebraska Press, "once a public hearing ha[s] been held, what
transpired there could not be subject to prior restraint.'
67
3. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia
In reaching its decision in Oklahoma Publishing, the Court relied in
part on the fact that there was no evidence that the press acquired the
information unlawfully or without the State's implicit approval.68 One year
later, however, in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,69 the
58. Id.
59. Id. at 309.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 309-10 (quoting OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 10, §§ 1111, 1125 (Supp. 1976)).
63. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (invalidating order prohibiting the
press from publishing information tending to show the defendant's guilt in an impending criminal
trial).
64. Oklahoma Publ'g, 430 U.S. at 311-12 (quoting Cox, 420 U.S. at 469,471 (1975)).
65. Id. at311.
66. Id. (citing Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 568).
67. Id
68. Id.
69. 435 U.S. 829 (1978). Although the Boehner court did not expressly rely on Landmark,
Landmark is discussed here because it is an essential part of the Court's constitutional
architecture in this area.
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Supreme Court was presented with an instance where the press had
received the information without the State's implicit approval.
In Landmark, the Virginia Pilot had published an article accurately
reporting on a pending inquiry by the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review
Commission, and named the specific judge whose conduct was being
investigated. 70 Virginia law made all proceedings of the Commission
confidential. 7' To implement this mandate, Virginia law further provided
that information concerning these proceedings could not be divulged by
any person to anyone except the Commission and any person who did
divulge the information would be guilty of a misdemeanor. 72 Thus, one
month after the Pilot revealed the confidential proceedings of the
Commission, a grand jury indicted the Pilot's publisher, Landmark, for
violating the statute.73 Landmark was subsequently convicted and fined
$500.74
The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction.75 Because
none of the Pilot reporters had been present during Commission
proceedings, 76 the Pilot must have obtained the information from an
individual who, in violation of Virginia law, breached the Commission's
confidentiality. Thus, the Supreme Court framed the issue as "whether the
First Amendment permits the criminal punishment of third persons who are
strangers to the inquiry, including the news media, for divulging or
publishing truthful information regarding confidential proceedings of the
Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission." 77  The Court held that
regardless of the original breach of confidentiality by an unknown party,
which could conceivably be punishable, the State could not punish the
Pilot.78 The Pilot could disseminate "accurate factual information about a
legislatively authorized inquiry" that it had lawfully obtained. 79 Yet, once
70. Id.
71. Id. at 830-31 n.1 (citing VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10; VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-37.13 (Michie
1973)).
72. Id. at 831 n.1 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-37.13 (Michie 1973)).
73. Id. at 831.
74. Id. at 832.
75. Landmark, 435 U.S. at 834.
76. d at 832.
77. Id. at 837.
78. Id. at 838.
79. Id. at 839. In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Stewart focused more
precisely on the ability of the state to punish a newspaper in this situation. Id As stated by
Justice Stewart, in language that would later be echoed in Florida Star.
[i]f the constitutional protection of a free press means anything, it means that
government cannot take it upon itself to decide what a newspaper may and may not
publish. Though government may deny access to information and punish its theft,
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again the Court refused to establish a bright line rule of general
applicability, preferring instead to resolve the narrower issues in the case
before it.80
4. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ 'g Co.
In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,8 the Court was presented with
another chance to address the issue. Smith involved a challenge to a West
Virginia statute barring newspapers from publishing the name of any child
in connection with a juvenile court proceeding without the written order of
the court.8 2 In Smith, two West Virginia newspapers published the name
and picture of a juvenile who was the main suspect in a shooting of a
fifteen year-old high school student.83 The papers learned of the shooting
by routine monitoring of the police band radio frequency, and learned of
the juvenile's name by asking various witnesses, the police, and an
assistant prosecuting attorney who were at the schoolm Several weeks
after the publication, a grand jury indicted the newspapers for violating a
West Virginia law, which prohibited the publication of the name of any
child involved in a juvenile proceeding.85 The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals issued a writ prohibiting this prosecution, holding that the
statute violated the First Amendment.
86
In affirming the decision, the Supreme Court interpreted Cox,
Oklahoma Publishing, and Landmark to mean that if the press "lawfully
obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state
officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information,
absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order. 87 The Court
further held that it was insignificant that the West Virginia newspapers had
not received the information from the government, as in Cox, Oklahoma
Publishing, and Landmark, but had instead received the information
through "routine newspaper reporting techniques."8  As stated by the
government may not prohibit or punish the publication of that information once it
falls into the hands of the press, unless the need for secrecy is manifestly
overwhelming.
Id. at 849 (Stewart, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 838.
81. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
82. Id. at 98 (citing W. VA. CODE § 49-7-3 (West 1976)).
83. Id. at 99-100.
84. Id. at 99.
85. Id. at 100.
86. Id. (citing Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 248 S.E.2d 269 (W. Va. 1978)).
87. Smith, 443 U.S. at 103.
88. Id.
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Court, "[a] free press cannot be made to rely solely upon the sufferance of
government to supply it with information." 9 Thus, the Court came close to
establishing a bright line rule by holding that where truthful information
concerning a matter of public significance is lawfully obtained, "state
officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information,
absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order."9
5. Florida Star v. B.J.F
Ten years later, in Florida Star v. B.J.F,9' the Supreme Court
expanded the Smith holding. In Florida Star, the Court reviewed the
constitutionality of a Florida statute that made it unlawful to "'print,
publish, or broadcast... in any instrument of mass communication' the
name of the victim of a sexual offense."' In October 1983, an alleged
victim of a robbery and sexual assault reported the incident to the Duval
County Sheriffs Department. After preparing a report, the Sheriff
inadvertently placed an unredacted copy in the pressroom, where there
were restrictions on access to police reports.93 While in the pressroom
reviewing recent reports for the Florida Star's "Police Reports" section, a
reporter-trainee copied the report verbatim, including the victim's name.94
There were signs in the pressroom making it clear that the names of rape
victims were not matters of public record and were not to be published.95
Nevertheless, after receiving the verbatim report from the trainee, a
Florida Star reporter drafted an article summarizing it, again including the
victim's name.96 This article was then published in violation of The
Florida Star's internal policy of not publishing the names of alleged sexual
89. Id. at 104.
90. Id. at 103. In his concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist criticized the Court's balance of
the First Amendment rights of the newspapers against the state's interests in assuring the
confidentiality of juvenile proceedings. Id. Justice Rehnquist concluded that such confidentiality
was an interest of the "highest order," justifying the "minimal interference with freedom of the
press." Id at 107-08 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist concurred in
the Court's finding that, given the statute's narrow focus on newspaper publishers (exempting the
electronic media and other forms of publication), the statute "[did] not accomplish its stated
purpose," and therefore could not pass muster under the First Amendment. Id at 110. Indeed, in
Smdth, three radio stations had broadcast the alleged juvenile assailant's name before the
Charleston Daily Mail published it, and, under the statute, the radio stations were exempt from
prosecution. Id.
91. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
92. Id. at 526 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.03 (West 1987)).
93. Id. at 527.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 546 (White, J., dissenting).
96. Id at 527.
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offense victims. 97  The alleged victim, "B.J.F.," subsequently filed suit
against The Florida Star and the Sheriffs Department, claiming that they
had negligently violated the State law. At the close of a subsequent jury
trial, The Florida Star was found liable under the statute, and B.J.F. was
awarded $100,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.98
The United States Supreme Court reversed, restating the rule
announced in Smith v. Daily Mail: "'if a newspaper lawfully obtains
truthful information about a matter of public significance then state
officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information,
absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order. ' '99
Recognizing the privacy interests various statutes have sought to protect,
the Court concluded that the government generally had other means of
protecting these interests. For example, "[t]o the extent sensitive
information rests in private hands, the government may under some
circumstances forbid its nonconsensual acquisition, thereby bringing
outside of the Daily Mail principle the publication of any information so
acquired."' 10 And, "[t]o the extent sensitive information is in the
government's custody, it has even greater power to forestall or mitigate the
injury caused by its release.'
10 1
Thus, the Florida Star Court concluded that the Smith rule applied
and that imposing liability on The Florida Star was not necessary to further
a State interest of the highest order.' °2 As stated by the Court, "[w]here...
the government has failed to police itself in disseminating information, it is
clear under Cox Broadcasting, Oklahoma Publishing, and Landmark
Communications that the imposition of damages against the press for its
subsequent publication can hardly be said to be a narrowly tailored means
of safeguarding anonymity."'0 3
97. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 528.
98. Id. (stating that B.J.F. had previously settled with the Sheriff's Department for $2,500).
99. Id at 533 (quoting Smith, 443 U.S. at 97, 103); see Fred H. Cate, Privacy and
Telecommunications, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 30 (1998) ("[T]he United States Supreme
Court has ruled that lawfully obtained, truthful information on a matter of public significance can
never be the subject of legal liability, at least not without satisfying the requirements of strict
scrutiny.").
100. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 534.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 537-41. But see Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., No. 7:95-CV-187-BR(3), 1998 WL
404491, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 21, 1998) (holding news reporter in contempt for reviewing
confidential settlement agreement inadvertently provided by court clerk, informing her editor of
its contents, and then publishing its contents). Ashcraj? is squarely in conflict with Oklahoma
Publ'g and Florida Star to the extent that it permits punishment for the disclosure of truthful,
newsworthy information that has voluntarily, albeit inadvertently, been provided by the court.
103. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 538.
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The Court further held that the statute's "negligence per se" standard
was overbroad because liability follows automatically from publication,
without the need for any factual findings concerning the circumstances of
the disclosure.'04 Finally, the Court found the statute to be underinclusive
because it only prohibits disclosures through instruments of mass
communication, and does not reach other types of disclosures.'15 This
finding thus rendered the selective ban incapable of "satisfactorily
accomplish[ing] its stated purpose.'
' °6
C. Legal Support for the Boehner Decision
Reluctantly, Judge Hogan found that his decision was controlled by
Florida Star.0 7 But the Cox / Florida Star line of cases do not expressly
control Judge Hogan's ruling. The Supreme Court has never been
presented with the precise factual scenario as in Boehner, namely, where
the media's source has obtained the information illegally.
However, Judge Hogan's decision in Boehner is correct and is
supported by the case law. It stands simply as a logical application of the
Cox / Florida Star rule. Given Congress's failure to prohibit the receipt of
illegally intercepted communications, McDermott obtained the information
legally. Moreover, there is no evidence that McDermott conspired with the
Martins to obtain the information. McDermott was simply a third party
who happened to have the fruits of their criminal activity presented to him.
Consistent with the Cox/Florida Star line of cases, McDermott was free to
disclose, publish, or "use" this information as he wished.
Although Landmark was not expressly relied upon in Boehner, it
provides strong support for Judge Hogan's ruling. In Landmark, as here,
the defendant's source illegally disclosed the information to the
defendant-in that case by violating the Virginia statutes ensuring that the
proceedings of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission remain
104. Id. at 539.
105. Id. at 540-41.
106. Id. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, dissented
from the Court's ruling, asserting that Justice Marshall's opinion had the effect of "obliterat[ing]
one of the most noteworthy legal inventions of the 20th Century: the tort of the publication of
private facts." Id. at 550 (White, J., dissenting).
107. Indeed, throughout the opinion, Judge Hogan continually criticizes the application of
the First Amendment in this context. Boehner v. McDermott, No. CIV. 98-594 TFH, 1998 WL
436897, at *4 (D.D.C. July 28, 1998). Judge Hogan writes that the application of Florida Star's
principles to the Boehner case "effectively undermines the protection that wiretap statutes
supposedly afford[.]" Id. For reasons discussed later in this Article, Judge Hogan's concern is
misplaced, but this language aptly demonstrates his discomfort with the result he ultimately
reached.
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confidential.' °8 Nevertheless, the Landmark Court found that the Virginia
Pilot had lawfully obtained the information, thus making the ultimate
disclosure not punishable.1°9 In short, the source's illegal conduct could
not be imputed to the Virginia Pilot absent a clear agency relationship or
proven conspiracy. Similarly in Boehner, Judge Hogan found that the
Martins' illegal act could not be imputed to McDermott to render his
acquisition of the information unlawful. "0
The facts presented in Boehner are also similar to those presented in
Pearson v. Dodd,"' a venerable opinion by Judge Skelly Wright
concerning the removal and copying of papers from the office of then
Connecticut Senator Thomas Dodd." 2 In Pearson, two former employees
of Senator Dodd entered his office without his authority and copied
numerous documents that proved damaging to Dodd." 3  The former
employees then gave copies of these documents to newspaper columnist
Jack Anderson, who was aware of how the employees had illegally
obtained the documents."14 Anderson and columnist Drew Pearson then
published articles containing information taken from the Dodd
documents. 1 5 Dodd sued Pearson and Anderson for invasion of privacy
and conversion.
Rejecting Dodd's suit, the District of Columbia Circuit stated:
If we were to hold appellants liable for invasion of privacy on
these facts, we would establish the proposition that one who
receives information from an intruder, knowing it has been
obtained by improper intrusion, is guilty of a tort. In an untried
and developing area of tort law, we are not prepared to go so far.
A person approached by an eavesdropper with an offer to share
in the information gathered through the eavesdropping would
perhaps play the nobler part should he spurn the offer and shut
his ears. However, it seems to us that at this point it would place
108. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 830-31 (1978).
109. Id. at 837.
110. Boehner, 1998 WL 436897, at *4.
111. Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 703. Anderson's secretary may have also helped with the secret copying of the
documents, although the record in the case is unclear. See id at 705 n.20. This fact was not
definitively established in either the district court or the D.C. Circuit opinions. Id; see Dodd v.
Pearson, 279 F. Supp. 101, 102 (D.D.C. 1968).
114. Pearson, 410 F.2d at 703.
115. Id.
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too great a strain on human weakness to hold one liable in
damages who merely succumbs to temptation and listens. 
116
Moreover, the Pearson court summarily rejected Dodd's publication claim,
emphasizing that "[i]t has always been considered a defense to a claim of
invasion of privacy by publication.., that the published matter complained
of is of general public interest."' 1 7 Clearly, that was the case in Pearson, as
well as in Boehner.
The California Court of Appeal's decision, in Nicholson v. McClatchy
Newspapers"8 also supports Judge Hogan's ruling in Boehner. In
Nicholson, the defendant newspaper reported that the California
Commission on Judicial Nominees Evaluation found the plaintiff "not
qualified" for judicial appointment.1 9 The information was confidential
and the disclosure to the newspapers violated California law.' 20 The
plaintiff sued the newspapers for invasion of privacy, contending that the
newspapers improperly obtained and published the confidential
information. 121
The California court rejected the plaintiff's claim. Relying primarily
on the factually analogous Landmark case, the Nicholson court strongly
emphasized that "[w]hile the government may desire to keep some
proceedings confidential and may impose the duty upon participants to
maintain confidentiality, it may not impose criminal or civil liability upon
the press for obtaining and publishing newsworthy information through
routine reporting techniques.' ' 122 Under this principle, the newspapers
could not be held liable for publishing the newsworthy information because
the papers had obtained the confidential information as a result of non-
tortious interviews with sources possibly within the Commission-a
routine newsgathering technique that did not violate any laws. Therefore,
the illegal activity by the source, disclosing the confidential information for
which the source might be punished, could not be imputed to the
newspapers and, thus, could not justify liability for publication.
Judge Hogan's opinion in Boehner stands for the same principle.
Representative McDermott obtained the illegally intercepted
communication by means of non-tortious activity-simply receiving it
116. Id. at 705.
117. Pearson, 410 F.2d at 703.
118. 177 Cal. App. 3d 509 (1986).
119. Id. at 512.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 519-20 (citing Landmnark, 435 U.S. at 837-38 (1978)).
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from the Martins.' 23 Accordingly, under the direct holding of Florida Star,
the First Amendment could not permit the imposition of liability on
McDermott for his subsequent publication of this information. 2 4 In short,
as in Nicholson, the Martins' illegal activity could not be imputed to
McDermott.
In Peavy v. New Times, Inc.,25 the one other published federal court
decision to consider the proper constitutional reach of 18 U.S.C. sections
251 l(c) and (d) in an analogous situation, the court similarly ruled that the
First Amendment does not permit liability for the publication of lawfully
obtained information of public significance. In Peavy, an unknown person
illegally wiretapped several private telephone conversations in which a
public school board trustee made numerous racial slurs and profane
comments.' 26 Audiotapes of the wiretapped conversations were delivered
anonymously to other trustees who then authorized a written transcript of
the conversations to be read into the minutes of a public school board
meeting. 12  The defendant newspaper obtained a copy of the meeting
minutes through a public records act request and published the complete
transcript of the illegally intercepted conversations. 12 The plaintiff sued
the newspaper, contending that this publication violated the federal wiretap
statute. 1
29
The federal district court rejected the claim, due to the fact that the
newspaper had obtained the tape transcripts lawfully from school board
records, open to the public, and that the plaintiff's racist views were clearly
a matter of public concern. 3° The court held that even if the newspaper
knew that the conversations had been illegally intercepted, the First
Amendment would not tolerate a finding of liability.'
123. See Boehner, 1998 WL 436897, *1.
124. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
125. 976 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
126. Id. at 534.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 535. Apparently, the Dallas Morning News also received a tape of the
conversations. Id. at 535 n.8. It is unclear how the Dallas Morning News obtained this tape. Id.
129. Id. at 536-37.
130. Id at 538-40.
131. Peavy, 976 F. Supp at 538-39. In a parallel case, on February 19, 1999, United States
District Court Judge Jerry Buchmeyer similarly granted summary judgement in favor of WFAA-
TV, dismissing similar claims. See Peavy v. WFAA-TV, No. 3:96-CV-2945-R (N.D. Tex. Feb.
19, 1999).
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D. Contrary Views
As discussed above, Judge Hogan's opinion in Boehner is consistent
with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment, as
expressed in the Cox / Florida Star line of cases. However, none of these
cases discussed above are directly on point with Boehner. In comparison,
Cox, Smith, Oklahoma Publishing, and Florida Star all involved
information voluntarily given by the government or private parties (albeit
in Florida Star, unintentionally). Moreover, although Landmark and
Nicholson involved information that was illegally disclosed, neither
involved information illegally obtained in the first place, as in Boehner.
Rather, the confidential information was simply illegally disclosed by those
entrusted with it to the press, who then published it. Peavy is
distinguishable because the newspaper obtained the illegally intercepted
information from the minutes of a public school board meeting and not
from the person who originally taped the information. Thus, the
information in question was already a matter of public record.
Moreover, in Natoli v. Sullivan,132 a New York lower court held that
the First Amendment did not bar a finding of liability under 18 U.S.C.
section 251 1(1)(c). 133  In Natoli, several individuals intercepted and
recorded several telephone conversations that were relevant to an upcoming
local mayoral campaign. 134 A tape of these conversations was obtained by
an individual who distributed it to two newspapers.1 3' Both newspapers
published the information knowing the information was originally obtained
in violation of the federal wiretap statute.136 Relying on the Cox / Florida
Star line of cases, the defendants moved to dismiss.
The New York court denied the motion holding that "[tihere is no
general rule of law protecting the newspapers from liability for statutory
damages for publication of contents of conversations illegally intercepted
by others but obtained lawfully by the newspapers."'' 37 The Natoli court
distinguished Landmark, and the other seemingly dispositive cases
involving illegal disclosures on the ground that in those cases "the
information published was not the product of wrongdoing or statutory
violation in the first instance, but was, in fact, information properly part of
132. 606 N.Y.S.2d 504 (Sup. Ct. 1993), aff'd, 616 N.Y.S.2d 318 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 505.
135. Id at 506.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 507.
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the public records, albeit protected by statutory confidentiality[.]"' 3 As
stated in Natoli, "[t]he material published was not merely leaked in
violation of a statute requiring it to be kept secret-it was illegally created
in the first instance-the fruit of an illegal wiretap."'3 9
The information at issue in Natoli was always in private hands and
never in governmental custody. Hence, there was no overriding
governmental interest to be protected, nor any issue of government having
placed the information in the public domain.'o The court also noted that
although the material published was of public interest, it was not of
paramount public significance or import.141 Accordingly, the Natoli court
allowed the plaintiff's case to proceed.
However, the Natoli formulation contravenes the Cox / Florida Star
line of cases and is suspect. In Florida Star, the Supreme Court
emphatically stated that "if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful
information about a matter of public significance then state officials may
not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to
further a state interest of the highest order."' 42 Clearly, the newspapers in
Natoli obtained the information lawfully. They had no involvement in the
original interception and were simply given the material. Thus, even with
the Supreme Court's avoidance of the precise issue presented in Boehner
and Natoli, the New York court's imposition of liability on the newspapers
contravenes the essential rule established by the Cox / Florida Star line of
cases: the government cannot punish an individual or entity for disclosing
truthful information of public significance that it has lawfully acquired,
absent a state interest of the highest order. 43
Moreover, the Natoli distinction between the publication of
confidential information illegally disclosed (as in Landmark) and obtained
(as in Natoli and Boehner) makes little sense. In both circumstances,
private information was illegally disclosed and made public. It is irrelevant
that in one instance the information already existed but was disclosed
illegally, and in the other, the information was both captured and disclosed
illegally.
In addition, Natoli's distinction between material in private custody
versus that in government custody has no support in the case law. Indeed,
138. Natoli, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g
Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
143. Id
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in Smith v. Daily Mail, the press did not obtain the information in question
from the government but through witness interviews and other routine
newspaper reporting techniques.144 In response to the argument that the
Cox rule should only apply to information obtained from the government,
the Supreme Court responded that "[a] free press cannot be made to rely
solely upon the sufferance of government to supply it with information.
' '14'
Moreover, the distinction makes little sense. The point of the Cox / Florida
Star line of cases is to preserve the public's ability to receive information
of "public significance."'6 Whether that publicly significant information is
obtained from the government or from private actors matters little in
determining the public's right to receive the information or the media's
right to disclose it.
Finally, Natoli's distinction between matters of "public interest" and
matters of "paramount public significance or import" has no support in the
case law.' 47 Indeed, as recounted in Boehner, the name of a rape victim
hardly has paramount public significance or import, yet, the Supreme Court
in Florida Star still found it was of sufficient public significance to invoke
the First Amendment to permit the disclosure by the press.' 4  Hence,
conversations relevant to a local mayoral campaign, at issue in Natoli, meet
that First Amendment litmus test as well. 149 In both circumstances, the
matters in question involve government or political affairs, the disclosure
and discussion of which have always been at the core of First Amendment
protection. 150  Thus, even if one accepts Natoli's "paramount public
significance" standard, it is hard to think of anything of higher First
Amendment importance than free and unfettered reporting about
governmental proceedings and political matters.
In contrast, the government's interest in suppressing the disclosures
presented in Natoli and Boehner is particularly weak, especially given the
government's ability to punish those who actually intercepted the cellular
transmissions. The government's weak interest here is illustrated by the
relatively minor punishment inflicted upon those wrongdoers. In the case
144. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979).
145. Id. at 104.
146. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 533.
147. It is difficult to assess the Natoli discussion of newsworthiness given that none of the
details of the communications at issue were revealed in the opinion.
148. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 533.
149. Natoli, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 683.
150. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838-39 (1978)
(referring to Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("Whatever differences may exist about
interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major
purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.")).
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of the Martins, their sole punishment was a fine of merely $500.'1 In
addition, the government's interest in protecting the privacy of cellular
communications (at issue in Boehner) is particularly suspect given that
cellular transmissions are easily overheard. Accordingly, there is a lesser
expectation of privacy with regard to cellular communications.5 2 Further,
to the extent that the government wants to deter future illegal interceptions,
there are numerous alternatives other than suppressing speech-such as
increasing penalties on the interceptors or completely banning scanning
devices.
Accordingly, the Natoli holding is wrong and contravenes
fundamental First Amendment principles. The government's interest in
protecting the privacy of cellular transmissions simply does not rise to the
requisite level warranting -an intrusion upon the fundamental First
Amendment interest in protecting the unfettered disclosure of truthful
information about matters of public significance.
E. A Neutral Law of General Applicability? The Impact of Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co. and Other Cases Concerning Speech Neutral Laws
Another line of argument used to attack the Boehner holding exists.
Some would argue that the wiretap statute is not directed at the press, or at
suppressing speech per se, it is a neutral law of general applicability, and
therefore valid under Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.153 A related argument
posits that because the wiretap statute is a general law that imposes only an
incidental burden on speech and is not content-discriminatory, it need only
satisfy intermediate scrutiny.1"
Currently pending before the Third Circuit is Bartnicki v. Vopper,1
55
which squarely presents these arguments. In Bartnicki, the plaintiffs, an
employee of the Pennsylvania State Educational Association ("PSEA") and
a teacher at Wyoming Valley West High School and President of the
Teachers' Union, were both involved in heated negotiations with the
151. Landmark, 435 U.S. at 832.
152. See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108
Stat. 4279 (1994). Indeed, Congress did not change the law to explicitly include cellular
communications until 1994. This further demonstrates the government's lackluster interest in
punishing the disclosure of cellular communications.
153. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (holding 5-4 that a newspaper
could be held liable under a promissory estoppel theory for failing to adhere to a promise of
confidentiality to a source).
154. Brief for Appellees at 17, Bartnicki v. Vopper, No. 3 Civ. 94-1201 (M.D. Pa. 1998)
(No. 98-7156).
155. Id. at 1.
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Wyoming Valley West School District for pay raises.1 6 In May 1993, the
plaintiffs, Bartnicki and Kane had a conversation on a cellular telephone
concerning the negotiations, during which Kane made several colorful
statements concerning the teachers' tactics.'17 Unbeknownst to them, this
conversation was scanned and recorded by an unknown individual." 8
The unknown individual then provided a copy of the tape recording to
Jack Yocum, the President of the Wyoming Valley West Taxpayers'
Association and an opponent of the wage increase. 159 After concluding that
the voices on the tape were those of Bartnicki and Kane, Yocum gave
copies to various radio stations, two newspapers, and two television
stations.' 6° The newspapers, radio stations, and television stations then
published transcripts and/or broadcast portions of the illegally recorded
cellular conversation.16'
Bartnicki and Kane then sued Yocum and the various media
organizations, contending that the defendants' actions violated the federal
wiretap statute and the analogous Pennsylvania statute. 162  Judge Kosik
held that because the wiretap statute was a law of general applicability, and
did not single out the press, it passed muster under Cohen. 6'
Yocum and the media defendants appealed this ruling. In defense of
the district court's ruling, the plaintiffs essentially reiterated the district
court's argument founded upon Cohen, in addition to arguing that the Cox /
Florida Star line of cases did not apply because the information was
unlawfully obtained in the first place. 64 The United States Department of
Justice filed a Brief supporting the Appellee's position in the case and
defending the constitutionality of the wiretap statute. 65  In addition to
raising the Cohen argument, the government has argued that only
intermediate scrutiny applies because the statute is a content-neutral law
and only incidentally burdens speech. 66
156. Id at3.
157. See id at 4. At one point, Kane stated that "[i]f [the School Directors] are not going to
move for three percent (3%), we're gonna have to go to their homes... to blow off their front
porches, we'll have to do some work on some of those guys." Id
158. See id at 2. This individual, apparently, remains unknown.
159. Id. at5.
160. Brief of Appellees at 5, Barlnicki (No. 98-7156).
161. See id
162. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5701, 5725 (West 1999).
163. Brief of Appellees at 17, Bartnicki (No. 98-7156).
164. Id at 21-23.
165. See id at1.
166. Id at 12.
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1. The Impact of Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.
Cohen raised the question of whether a plaintiff could recover
damages under a promissory estoppel theory for a journalist's breach of a
promise of confidentiality, given in exchange for information.1 67 During
the 1982 Minnesota gubernatorial race, a Republican activist named Dan
Cohen, who was associated with Independent-Republican candidate
Wheelock Whitney, approached reporters from two newspapers. 68 Cohen
offered to provide documents relating to a candidate in the election.' 69
Cohen apparently told the reporters that he would provide the information
only under a promise of confidentiality.1 70 The reporters accepted this
condition and received the documents which concerned the 1969 and 1970
arrests of the candidate for Lieutenant Governor, Marlene Johnson, for
unlawful assembly and petit theft.
171
The newspapers published Cohen's name in connection with their
stories concerning Johnson, despite their reporters' previous promises.' 7
In subsequent stories, the newspapers identified Cohen as the source of the
documents, indicated his connection to the Whitney campaign, and
included denials by the Whitney campaign of any involvement in the
matter.' Cohen was fired by his employer the same day. 74 Cohen then
sued the newspapers, alleging fraud and breach of contract, and was
awarded $200,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive
damages.
175
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the compensatory damage
award, finding that the fraud and breach of contract claims failed as a
matter of law.' 76 However, the Minnesota court considered the question of
whether the claim founded on promissory estoppel might be valid,
ultimately concluding that such a claim would violate the First
Amendment.1'7
The Supreme Court reversed the Minnesota court's ruling. Finding
the Cox / Florida Star cases inapplicable to this situation, even though the
167. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991).
168. Id
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 666.
173. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 666.
174. Id.
175. Id
176. Id.
177. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W. 2d 199 (1990).
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newspapers had published newsworthy information lawfully acquired, the
Supreme Court concluded that the press could be held liable under the
principle that "generally applicable laws do not offend the First
Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.78
Justices Blackmun, Marshall, Souter, and O'Connor dissented.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall and Souter, contended that
the case was controlled by Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell.179 In
Falwell, the Supreme Court held that the use of a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress to impose liability for the publication of a
satirical critique violated the First Amendment. 80 In Justice Blackmun's
view, Hustler and Cohen were indistinguishable because they both
involved laws of general applicability (intentional infliction of emotional
distress and promissory estoppel), which were not designed to suppress
speech.'' Moreover, the application of the promissory estoppel doctrine
was not an incidental burden on speech because the publication of the
political speech (i.e., revealing Cohen's identity) was the alleged
violation. 8 2 Thus, following Smith v. Daily Mail83 and Hustler, Justice
Blackmun contended that strict scrutiny should apply. 84
In a separate dissent joined by Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and
O'Connor, Justice Souter offered a more nuanced analysis. Justice Souter
considered the majority's conception of a neutral law of general
applicability as begging and ultimately ignoring the real question of
whether the law actually suppressed or chilled activity protected by the
First Amendment.'85 As stated by Justice O'Connor in her concurring
opinion in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith,
186
"[t]here is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of general
applicability."' 8 7 In Justice Souter's view, "such laws may restrict First
Amendment rights just as effectively as those directed at speech itself."' 88
Thus, according to Justice Souter, when presented with a law of general
178. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.
179. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
180. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 674 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Hustler, 485 U.S. 46 (1998)).
181. Id. at 675.
182. Id.
183. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
184. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 676.
185. See id at 677 (Souter, J., dissenting).
186. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
187. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 677 (citing Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Employment
Div., Dept. ofHuman Resources of Or., 494 U.S. at 901).
188. Id. at 677 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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applicability, a court must "articulate, measure, and compare the competing
interests involved.. .to determine the legitimacy of burdening
constitutional interests."' 89
For Justice Souter, the importance of the public's interest in a free,
unhindered press was integral to the balance that should have been struck
in Cohen.19° Because of the fact that Cohen's identity "expanded the
universe of information relevant to the choice faced by Minnesota
voters... the publication. . was thus the sort quintessentially subject to
strict First Amendment protection.' 19' Applying his fact specific analysis,
Justice Souter concluded that the newspapers were not liable because the
State's interest in enforcing a newspaper's promise of confidentiality was
insufficient to outweigh the interest in unfettered publication of the
information revealed about Cohen.192
Regardless of how Cohen was decided, Justice Souter's more
complex view, and the one followed in Florida Star, was correct. This
approach focused on the newsworthiness of the material by balancing the
public's need for the information versus the government's desire to protect
its citizens. 9' The majority's formulation approving generally applicable
laws is also entirely undercut by the Supreme Court's application of First
Amendment limits to defamation cases, which also involve generally
applicable law. Thus, the majority's formulation in Cohen is wrong.
But a thorough analysis of all aspects of Cohen is beyond the scope of
this Article. Suffice it to say, however, Judge Kosik's application of Cohen
to the wiretap situation is incorrect. Unlike the Bartnicki or Boehner
situations, in Cohen, the newspapers voluntarily accepted a limitation on
their right to publish newsworthy information. Ultimately, the newspapers
broke their promises. Hence, the imposition of compensatory damages
could be viewed as a cost of doing business.' 94 In this way, Cohen is
indistinguishable from the other cases cited and distinguished in
Boehner. 95 As stated by Judge Hogan, Cohen and the other cases all
189. Id.
190. Id. at 678.
191. Id.
192. See id at 678-79. Applying his balancing approach, Justice Souter also envisioned
circumstances where the media might be held liable, such as where "the injured party is a private
individual, whose identity is of less public concern than that of' Cohen. Id
193. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 678-79.
194. Id. at 670. As Justice White put it, "a generous bonus to be paid to a confidential news
source." Id.
195. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (upholding a conviction of a federal
judge who disclosed the edstence of a wiretap to the subject of the surveillance, in violation of
federal law); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (upholding a protective order
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involved instances where "information was lawfully obtained only pursuant
to a duty not to disclose; thus, in each case, the [law] at issue merely
enforced a pre-existing, independent prohibition against disclosure, without
which the information could not have been lawfully obtained.'
' 96
Indeed, Judge Hogan's point is borne out by the facts of Landmark,
which also involved a neutral law of general applicability. In Landmark,
the Supreme Court held that a general law prohibiting any person from
divulging information concerning the proceedings of the Virginia Judicial
Inquiry and Review Commission could not constitutionally be used to
punish the media for disclosing such information that it had lawfully
obtained. 97 As stated by the Court, regardless of whether the law was one
of general applicability, the State could not punish the media's
dissemination of "accurate factual information about a legislatively
authorized inquiry."' 98 In light of Landmark, Cohen must be limited to its
facts; specifically, where the press only obtained the information pursuant
to an enforceable promise not to disclose the identity of the source.
Landmark bars the imposition of liability where the press has not
voluntarily assumed such a restriction on its First Amendment right of
disclosure, but instead has been involuntarily restricted by statute, unless
the strict scrutiny standard is satisfied.
Cohen merely stands for the proposition that the media must play by
generally applicable rules. Cohen does not hold that the government may
suppress speech or disclosures concerning matters of public concern simply
on the ground that it does so pursuant to a law of general applicability. To
interpret Cohen in such a fashion would undercut not only Landmark, but
also decades of First Amendment jurisprudence. 199 Accordingly, Judge
Kosik's application of Cohen in the Bartnicki case is flawed and cannot
withstand scrutiny.
prohibiting a news media litigant from disclosing information lawfully obtained in discovery);
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (upholding a judgment against a former CIA agent
who wrote a book disclosing secrets that he lawfully obtained on the job).
196. Boehner v. McDermott, No. CIV. 98-594 TFH, 1998 WL 436897, at *6 (D.D.C. July
28, 1998).
197. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837 (1978).
198. Id. at 839.
199. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Here, the Supreme Court
ruled that certain generally applicable laws, such as common law defamation, are severely limited
by the First Amendment. Id.
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2. Intermediate Scrutiny
In Bartnicki and in Boehner, the government has argued that the
wiretap statute should only be subjected to intermediate scrutiny, instead of
the strict scrutiny applied in Florida Star, because it does not "single out"
speech, or particular points of view.2 ° Rather, the government argues, the
burden on speech imposed by the statute is only incidental and therefore
only intermediate scrutiny should apply.20' The government rests its
argument primarily on cases involving laws which are not specifically
directed at speech, such as United States v. O'Brien 202 and Barnes v. Glen
Theater, Inc.
20 3
The problem with the government's argument, however, is that the
wiretap statute is directed at speech, specifically, the disclosure of
information that, while acquired lawfully by the media, was originally
acquired unlawfully. As in Boehner and Bartnicki, the speech at issue is
newsworthy political speech, which has traditionally received the highest
First Amendment protection. 204 This hardly constitutes an "incidental"
burden on speech. Thus, the application of O'Brien to defend the
constitutionality of the wiretap statute is not persuasive.
Another argument posited by the government is that intermediate
scrutiny should apply because, even if directed at speech, the law is
content-neutral.20 ' The law does not prohibit the disclosure of only certain
illegally obtained information, it prohibits the disclosure of all of it,
therefore, it is content-neutral.2°
However, the content-neutrality argument is severely undercut by
Butterworth v. Smith.0 7 In Butterworth, the Supreme Court unanimously
200. Boehner, 1998 WL 436897, at *4-*6 (D.D.C. July 28, 1998); see Brief for the United
States at 12, Bartnicki v. Vopper, No. 3 Civ. 94-1201 (M.D. Pa. 1998) (No. 98-7156).
201. Brief for United States at 12, Bartnicki (No. 98-7156).
202. 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (applying a variant of intermediate scrutiny to affirm the
conviction of an individual for burning his Selective Service registration card).
203. 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (applying the O'Brien intermediate scrutiny test to affirm the
application of a public indecency law to a nude dancing establishment).
204. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988) (stating that political speech is "an area
in which the importance of First Amendment protections is 'at its zenith').
205. See Boehner, 1998 WL 436897, at *4-*6.
206. The government relies on a few cases in support of its argument. The first case is
Turner Broad System, Inc. v. Federal Commnmications Commrvn 512 U.S. 622 (1994). In
Turner, the Supreme Court applied intermediate scrutiny to evaluate the constitutionality of the
"must carry" provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 1992. Id In a
second case, Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, the Court applied intermediate
scrutiny to evaluate the constitutionality of the National Park Service's denial of a permit for
protesters to camp in Washington, D.C.'s National Mall or Lafayette Park. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
207. 494 U.S. 624 (1990).
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invalidated a Florida statute208 prohibiting a grand jury witness from
disclosing the content of his or her own testimony after the grand jury's
term has ended. 209 The witness in question, a news reporter, was called to
testify before the grand jury concerning information he had obtained while
gathering news regarding alleged improprieties committed by the Charlotte
County State Attorney's Office and Sheriff's Department. 210  After the
grand jury terminated its investigation, the reporter unsuccessfully sought
to publish a news story concerning the investigation. 21' The reporter sued
the Florida Attorney General, seeking a declaration that the Florida statute
was an unconstitutional abridgment of free speech.2'2
Applying Landmark and other cases in the Cox / Florida Star line, the
Supreme Court agreed.213 The Court noted that the interests advanced by
the State were not sufficiently compelling to overcome the reporter's First
Amendment right to make a truthful statement of information which he
acquired on his own.214
As with the wiretap statute, the Butterworth statute did not
specifically target speech based on its content.21 .5 Rather, it prohibited all
witnesses from disclosing their testimony, whatever its content.2 6
Nonetheless, contrary to the government's argument in Boehner and
Bartnicki, the Butterworth Court applied the strict scrutiny test established
in Florida Star, Smith, and Landmark stating "where a person 'lawfully
obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance, ... state
officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information,
absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.'
21 7
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Lind v. Grimmer28 similarly
undermines the content-neutrality argument.21 9 In Lind, the plaintiff filed a
complaint against the University of Hawaii Professional Assembly
contending that the Assembly had failed to disclose certain campaign
208. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 905.27 (West 1999).
209. See Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 624.
210. Id. at 626.
211. Id. at 628.
212. Id
213. Id. at 632.
214. Id. at 636.
215. See generally Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 627 (citing the FLA. STAT. ANN. § 905.27
(West 1998)).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 632 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)); see Florida Star v.
B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989).
218. 30 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1994).
219. See id.
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contributions made in support of Hawaii Governor John D. Waihee. 20 A
Hawaii statute required that all aspects of the Commission's activities
remain confidential while a complaint is pending. 22' The plaintiff, the
publisher of the Hawaii Monitor, filed an action in federal court seeking a
declaration that the statute prohibiting publication was unconstitutional.22 2
Following Butterworth, the Ninth Circuit held that "[b]ecause [the concerns
addressed by the statute] all stem from the direct communicative impact of
speech,. .. [the statute] regulates speech on the basis of its content.
'221
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit applied the Cox / Florida Star strict scrutiny
test and struck down the statute as unconstitutionally repressing the
disclosure of truthful information.224 In light of these authorities, any
argument seeking intermediate scrutiny on the basis of content-neutrality
should fail.
225
IV. THE LARGER CONTEXT
Judge Hogan's resolution in Boehner is correct under prevailing law,
and Natoli was wrongly decided. In the Cox / Florida Star line of cases,
the Supreme Court established that where information of public
significance has been lawfully obtained by the press, the First Amendment
generally prohibits the government from punishing its subsequent
disclosure.22 If the Supreme Court were to agree with Natoli, that a person
or organization that lawfully obtains private information of public
220. Seeid at 1117.
221. HAw. REV. STAT. § 11-216(d)(Supp. 1997).
222. Lind, 30 F.3d at 1117.
223. Id. at 1118.
224. Id at 1120-21.
225. The Landmark case itself also undermines the "content-neutrality" argument, for the
anti-disclosure rule is arguably "content-neutral" banning all disclosures concerning the Judicial
Inquiry and Review Commission. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829,
831 (1978) (citing VA. CODE § 2.1-37.13 (Michie 1995)). Similarly here, the wiretap statute
purportedly bans all disclosures of information originally obtained in violation of the wiretap
statute. Id Ultimately, Landmark stands for the fundamental principle that "[o]nce a fact is
deemed newsworthy, First Amendment interests in speaking the truth about it are held universally
to override the attendant incursion into the plaintiff's privacy rights[.]" Jonathan B. Mintz, The
Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private Domain, 55 MD. L. REv.
425, 442 (1996). This is true regardless of whether the law is deemed "content-based" or
"content-neutral."
226. This issue is quite separate from the question of whether the government may restrain
the press from publishing such information (i.e., by imposing a prior restraint). As illustrated by
the United States Supreme Court's decision in the "Pentagon Papers" case, New York Times Co.
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), and reemphasized by the Sixth Circuit in Proctor &
Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996), such prior restraints are almost
invariably unconstitutional.
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significance cannot then disclose that information, this would constitute a
major change of course for the Court. As recognized by Justice Marshall in
Florida Star, in each case involving these matters, the Court has "without
exception upheld the press' right to publish [matters of public
significance]."227
There is good reason for this consistency to continue, especially in the
context of claims under the federal wiretap statute. The press' publication
of information obtained from a source who violates the law, or a private
legal duty, in obtaining the information, has been at the heart of some of
the most significant news stories of the last few decades. 228 Clearly, the
Court continually seeks to ensure that the press is unfettered in its ability to
communicate truthful, newsworthy information, and the Cox / Florida Star
formulation gives substance to that commitment. Failure to apply that rule
in the Boehner-type situation would constitute a major retreat from that
fundamental principle.
Moreover, as a statute that ostensibly seeks to prevent intrusions into
private communications, the law makes little sense because it punishes
innocent parties, such as the press, for the wrongdoings of others, namely,
those who illegally intercept the communications. In this way, it
contradicts the common sense reasoning in Pearson, which refused to
impute to the press any wrongdoing committed by Senator Dodd's former
employees.229 In short, only the person who intercepted the communication
actually intruded on the privacy of the plaintiff, not the person who simply
received the information.
As an anti-disclosure statute, the law is similarly muddled and raises
serious constitutional concerns. As a general rule, "where the claim is that
private information concerning plaintiff has been published, the question of
whether that information is genuinely private or is of public interest should
not turn on the manner in which it has been obtained.'23°  But, the
disclosure claim created by the wiretap statute flips this principle. The key
to the statutory violation is the original intrusion and not the content of the
allegedly wrongful disclosure. Once the intrusion occurs, liability to the
ultimate discloser is assured, if the discloser knows or should know the
source of the information. This is true regardless of whether the
information is of public significance or not. As such, the statute is
227. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989).
228. These include the Pentagon Papers and the internal documents concerning the tobacco
company's knowledge of the harmful effects of cigarettes.
229. See Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947
(1969).
230. Id
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overbroad because it unconstitutionally restricts the public's access to
information of public concern, and punishes the media's disclosure of this
information.
231
This contradicts decades of case law attempting to fashion a balance
between the protection of privacy and the First Amendment's guarantee of
free speech and a free press. As stated by the Supreme Court, the
disclosure of true, But private information tort is where "claims of privacy
most directly confront the constitutional freedoms of speech and press.,
232
As one commentator has put it, "[o]nce a fact is deemed newsworthy, First
Amendment interests in speaking the truth about it are held universally to
override the attendant incursion into the plaintiff's privacy rights, which
generally are not viewed as possessing constitutional roots. '233 As far back
as 1890, the cardinal rule of privacy jurisprudence has been that "the right
to privacy does not prohibit any publication which is of public or general
interest.23
This constitutionally required newsworthiness principle is viewed
broadly. As discussed in the Restatement of Torts, it includes within its
scope not only "the use of names, likenesses or facts in giving information
to the public for purposes of education, amusement, or enlightenment,
when the public may reasonably be expected to have a legitimate interest in
what is published., 235 The newsworthiness principle also includes matters
that are discussed in connection with the news or that bear some substantial
relevance to the newsworthy material 6  Thus, even if particular facts
about a plaintiff are not newsworthy in and of themselves, they are still
protected disclosures to the extent that they are discussed in connection
with matters of public significance. z 7
231. Moreover, given that the speech at issue is true, the application of the wiretap statute in
Boehner produces precisely the "perverse" anomaly envisioned by the Supreme Court in Florida
Star, where "truthful publications ... are less protected by the First Amendment then even the
least protected defamatory falsehoods: those involving purely private figures[.]" Florida Star,
491 U.S. at 539. In such cases where matters of public concern are at issue, truth is an absolute
defense and the plaintiff has the burden of proving falsity. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps, 474 U.S. 767 (1986). And in such a case, even if the plaintiff proves the speech is false,
the plaintiff at a minimum, must show, with "convincing clarity," actual malice to obtain
presumed or punitive damages. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
232. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. at 469, 489 (1975).
233. Jonathan B. Mintz, The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the
Private Domain, 55 MD. L. REv. at 425,442 (1996).
234. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193,
214 (1890); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. d (1977).
235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. j (1977).
236. Gilbert v. Medical Econs. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1981) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. g (1977)) (emphasis added).
237. See id
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As noted in Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., this broad definition
of public significance or newsworthiness "properly restricts liability for
public disclosure of private facts to the extreme case., 238  Therefore, it
"provid[es] the breathing space needed by the press to properly exercise
effective editorial judgment." 39 'This standard provides a privilege for
truthful publications that cease to operate only when an editor abuses his
broad discretion to publish matters that are of legitimate public interest.240
Therefore, it is consistent with the Supreme Court's conclusion in Florida
Star that where a "newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a
matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally
punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state
interest of the highest order." 24A'
Accordingly, Judge Hogan's application of the Florida Star test in
Boehner is in accordance with long-standing First Amendment and privacy
common law precedent. It strikes a proper balance between the
government's interest in protecting privacy, and the overriding
constitutional interest in fostering the free flow of information concerning
matters of public significance.
Consistent with the Cox / Florida Star line of cases, and with the
privacy precedent, therefore, the first step in any evaluation of the
application of a law such as the wiretap statute must be whether the
communication in question concerns a "matter of public significance. '" 242
Once a communication is determined to pertain to such a newsworthy
matter, then consistent with long-standing law, the Florida Star strict
scrutiny test must be met by the party seeking to punish the disclosure. In
light of the importance of First Amendment principles, the "public
significance" prong would be viewed broadly. Thus, even if the particular
communication was not particularly newsworthy in and of itself, its
disclosure would still be protected under Florida Star if the communication
bore a substantial relationship to a newsworthy subject.
This broad rule necessarily incorporates strong deference to
journalists and avoids the likelihood of any unconstitutional interference
with the freedom to report truthfully on matters of legitimate public
interest. Given the breathing space accorded the rule, it lessens the
temptation for judges to parse out particular topics that they do or do not
deem to be matters of public significance. While a communication
238. Id.
239. Id
240. Id.
241. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 533.
242. Id.
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concerning governmental activity or political affairs, as in Boehner, would
indisputably be a matter of public significance, there might be more debate
concerning a communication regarding, for example, a business transaction
between Microsoft and America Online or an upcoming Hollywood film.
However, the broad test for public significance would ensure that most of
the newsworthy decisions be made by reporters and editors, reserving only
the most extreme intrusions into private spheres to judicial scrutiny.
243
Once a communication is deemed to concern a matter of public
significance, then the party seeking to punish the disclosure would be
required to meet strict scrutiny analysis. Essentially it would balance the
need for repressing speech against the First Amendment right to disclose,
with a heavy thumb on the side of protecting the rights of free speech.
The first facet of the familiar strict scrutiny test would analyze the
government's interest in suppressing the disclosure. In other words,
whether it is so compelling as to override the First Amendment's protection
of speech. Thus, in the Boehner context, the government's interest in
punishing disclosure would be particularly unconvincing, as evidenced by
the meager punishment of the primary wrongdoing (i.e., the actual
interception of the communication). Moreover, any argument here would
be further undercut by the lesser expectation of privacy with regard to
cellular transmissions. And, as with the inquiry into whether the
communication concerned a matter of public significance, the inquiry
would be extremely deferential to free speech. For example, in Florida
Star, the statute in question, barring the publication of a rape victim's
name, did not meet strict scrutiny because the information in question was
related to a topic clearly within the core of free speech: governmental
processes. In this way, the compelling interest prong would echo the
standard for determining whether a topic was of public significance by
considering not just the communication itself but how it related to other
issues.
243. In a sense, the true problem with 18 U.S.C. section 2511(IXc) and (d) is one of
overbreadth because they subject individuals to punishment for the disclosure of both privately
and publicly significant information in all cases. Thus, the statute is not unlike the law struck
down in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). In Globe Newspaper, the
Supreme Court invalidated a Massachusetts law providing for the mandatory exclusion of the
general public from all trials concerning specified sexual offenses committed against minors. Id.
The Court noted that in certain cases, courts could exclude the public from the courtroom, but that
an across the board law precluding case-by-case application could not stand constitutional muster.
Id. at 607-08. Similarly here, a more narrowly focused law-punishing the disclosure of private,
non-newsworthy communications-would be much more likely to satisfy the dictates of the First
Amendment.
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The second prong of the strict scrutiny test would constitute an
inquiry into whether there are alternative means of meeting the
government's goals in punishing disclosure and whether banning speech is
the least restrictive alternative. Thus, in Boehner, the statute would fail this
test because lesser restrictive alternatives are clearly available. In short, the
government could more severely punish or inhibit the primary wrongdoing,
namely, the actual interception of the call. For example, as obvious
alternatives, penalties for the interception of cellular transmissions could be
increased, or scanning devices could be banned or severely regulated.
Given this, the wiretap statute cannot meet this prong of the strict scrutiny
test. Ultimately, a repression of speech of public significance cannot be
justified simply as just one alternative among many. It must be the only
alternative. That is clearly not so with regard to the wiretap statute and it is
therefore unconstitutional as applied in Boehner.
V. CONCLUSION
As the above discussion demonstrates, the federal wiretap statutes and
analogous state statutes cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny in
circumstances like those in Boehner. Therefore, Judge Hogan's opinion in
Boehner is correct and should be upheld by the District of Columbia
Circuit on appeal and, if necessary, by the United States Supreme Court. In
short, the wiretap statute unconstitutionally permits the government to
punish those who disclose newsworthy information that they have lawfully
obtained. Even under a conservative reading of the Supreme Court's Cox /
Floida Star line of cases, and decades of common law precedent, the First
Amendment does not permit Congress to do so. Moreover, even aside
from the question of whether the information was lawfully obtained, the
statute unconstitutionally muzzles the media's ability to impart truthful
information of public significance, This contradicts decades of reasoned
jurisprudence drawing a fine compromise between interests in privacy on
the one hand, and the constitutional guarantee of free speech and a free
press on the other.
